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The need often arises for a company to negotiate an agreement with its 
members and/or creditors, in order to modify an existing set of circumstances 
affecting the interests of the parties to the agreement ( 1). In certain 
circumstances the situation arises where due to large numbers involved, or 
unwillingness to participate in such an agreement difficulties are experienced 
to enter into and conclude negotiations with every single member or creditor. 
Accordingly the legislature has laid down a statutory procedure in Section 311 
of the Companies Act No 61 of 1973 in order to achieve the desired result. In 
terms of the section, a company can, subject to the supervision of the courts, 
bind its members and/or creditors to proposals agreed to by a majority of them. 
The terms of the section, such as "arrangement" and "compromise" have been 
the subject of several court decisions. Furthermore, in order to achieve a 
desired result, the terms of the section often have to be viewed in conjunction 
with provisions contained in the Companies Act itself, as well as other 
legislation. 
The compromises and arrangements referred to in the section have a wide 
application as expounded by court decisions (2) and commercial practice (3). 
The procedure to obtain the sanctioning thereof, is laid down in the Companies 
Act (4), and is to be seen in conjunction with the Rules concerning procedural 
conduct in the courts, as well as procedural precedent. 
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A standard scheme was developed in our practice for the achievement of an 
arrangement or compromise in terms of Section 311, (5) and applications for 
the sanctioning of such schemes were granted for a number of years as a 
matter of routine. The practice and industry active in the field was thereafter 
thrown into some confusion especially in the Transvaal and the Cape Province, 
primarily in view of the fact that the courts could find no active involvement of 
the company in a standard scheme (6). As a result of this various alternative 
schemes were devised in an effort to obtain the sanction of the courts in terms 
of section 311. The Appellate Division has now in the matter of Namex (7) 
heralded a return to the standard scheme in our law. 
In reflecting upon the above issues this dissertation will refer to the historical 
background to the Namex case, in view of the existence of schemes persuant 
to the decisions in Robin and Multi-Bou. Furthermore decisions involving the 




THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 311 and ANCILLARY PROVISIONS 
"ARRANGEMENT" and "COMPROMISE" 
The term "arrangements" as contemplated by the section is " .... of the widest 
character and ... the only limitations are that the scheme cannot authorise 
something contrary to the general law or wholly ulra vires the company .... "(1), 
and an arrangement will not be sanctioned if it is contrary to the general law or 
in fraudem legis (2). An arrangement has been stated to occur between a 
company and its members (3), whereas a compromise between a company 
and its creditors, although this distinction has been diminished by 
interchangeable useage. However, the Australian description of the term (4) 
has been referred to and approved (5), in that 
"The word "arrangement" is not restricted in its meaning by its 
association with the word "compromise". The former word has been 
given a liber·a1 meaning and, generally speaking, unless the arrangement 
is ultra vires the company or seeks to deal with a matter for which a 
special procedure is laid down or to evade a restriction imposed by the 
Act, almost any arrangement otherwise legal which touches or concerns 
the rights and obligations of the company or its members or 
creditors .... "(6) 
The concept "arrangement" implies that there must be an element of a 
compensating advantage to the relevant members or creditors which must 
' 
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relate to a degree of enforceable consideration for the parties concerned in an 
arrangement. 
Generally, a "compromise" implies the settlement of a dispute between a 
company and/or members over rights, or the modification of rights not the 
subject of dispute but with some difficulty of enforcement. The agreement 
must partly consist of a "mutual giving up of rights" (7). 
In the Namex case (8) it has been accepted by Van Heerden JA that an 
"arrangement" and a "compromise" are not synonymous, partly in view of the 
use of the two words by the legislator. In this respect, he rejected the view 
he,ld in the Multi-Bou case (9), that for the purposes of the section, an 
"arrangement" must contain an element of compromise. The reason for this, 
is that underlying a compromise, there must be the resolution of a dispute, and 
this need not be the purpose of an arrangement. Further explanation for this is 
the apparent figurative use by Berman J of the word "compromise" in that he 
characterised an adjustment of rights between the company and its creditors 
as "distinctive feature of a compromise". 
It is therefore clear that the main distinctive feature is that of the resolution of 
a dispute. Should there be an element thereof, then a "compromise" is being 
dealt with; and if this be absent, the term "arrangement". 
- 5 -
PROPOSED BETWEEN A COMPANY AND ITS CREDITORS ET SEQ 
The well known "standard scheme", in respect of a company under provisional 
liquidation as set out by Van Heerden JA in Namex, entails the following: 
(a) An offer by an initiator of a scheme of a certain amount to be distributed 
amongst the creditors of the company. 
(b) Upon proof in a prescribed manner of their claims the creditors receive 
payment thereof. 
(c) Upon a certain event, predominently the approval of the scheme,the 
creditors are deemed to have ceded their rights of recovery against the 
company, to the initiator of the scheme. 
(d) The deemed cession is a reduced amount of the full claim, mostly 
ninety-nine percent. 
(e) Upon approval of the scheme the company is released from provisional 
liquidation. 
The section makes it quite clear that the compromise or arrangement is to be 
proposed between a company and its creditors or members, and that the 
involvement of a company is a central feature. This has then been in issue in 
the cases where the validity of these scehemes has been placed in doubt. In 
the Robin case ( 1 0) it was held that in a scheme of this nature there was an 
arrangement between the initiator and the creditors of the company, and not 
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between the company and its creditors. This decision was thereafter followed 
in the Cape Provincial Division, in the Multi-Bou case ( 11), but not in the 
Strydom case in the Durban and Coast Local Division ( 1 2). In Multi-Bou ( 1 3) it 
was held that an agreement of creditors to reduce their claims against the 
company by one cent in the rand did not involve the company in the 
transaction between the creditors and the third party, as an instruction to the 
company to reflect reductions in the books of account of the company did not 
constitute an arrangement between the company and its creditors. This view 
that a reduction of a creditor's claim against a company can be achieved 
without the company's co-operation, has been rejected by the minority in 
Namex (14), as the settlement or partial settlement of a debt required the 
co-operation of the debtor. It was stated that the view had been based on an 
incorrect construction of Robin (15), in which it was held that the reduction of 
a claim was not part of the basic content of a standard scheme as 
implementation merely required entries in the books of the company. The 
deemed cession was the basic content of the scheme, and was aimed at an 
arrangement between the creditors and the third party, and not between the 
company and the creditors. Van Heerden J.A. was in agreement that merely 
because a provision pertaining to the reduction of a claim is contained in the 
agreement, it does not mean that a standard scheme has an arrangement 
between the company and its creditors as its object, but he held that a 
provision of this nature does involve the company. 
In the recent past doubt has also been cast on the so-called standard scheme 
on the grounds that supposed cession - terms in an agreement did not bring 
about an arrangement between a company and its creditors (16). Coetzee AJP 
in the Robin case stated his position on the issue as follows: 
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"In any such cession the company as debtor plays no role beyond having 
to pay its debts to its new creditors in respect of the same claims 
according to their tenor. It is a contract purely between cedent and 
cessionary. The only relevance of mentioning the company at all is 
purely to identify the subject-matter of the debt which is being 
ceded."(17) 
The Strydom case (18) in its disagreement with Robin cast greater uncertainty 
upon the matter. This disagreement was based on an acceptance that a 
cession flows from an agreement only between the cedent and the cessionary, 
but that a supposed cession is only deemed to be a consensual cession. In 
terms of this view, the company would be bound to a cession of a right to 
claim without the necessity of a consensual cession ( 1 9). 
The issue appears to have been settled in that the statutory mechanisms to 
bring about a certain result, that is, that contained in Section 311, make the 
debate around a consensual cession irrelevant. By virtue of the acceptance 
and approval in the prescribed manner, all creditors become statutory parties, 
and Section 311 (2) is the reason why a cession eventually takes place. For 
this purpose there is no requirement that the company should consent or 
co-operate (20). 
In practice however, especially in the event of a provisional liquidation, a 
cession of a right of recovery by creditors to an initiator is a central issue. This 
cession is only dependent on the recovery of the company, or its release from 
provisional liquidation, in that it would in the event of a final liquidation order 
be of no consequence. The recovery of the company therefore then goes hand 
in hand with an arrangement between the company and its creditors (21 ). 
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It has been held that there is no requirement in section 311 ( 1) that a scheme 
should only contain an arrangement between a company and its creditors(22). 
Clearly therefore there should mostly be some element of agreement between 
the initiator and the company's creditors; it is indeed inconceivable, especially 
in the event of insolvency that there would mostly be instances of an 
arrangement between only the company and its creditors. In the same 
manner, in the event of a provisional liquidation, a liquidator would be a party 
to the agreement, in that he is to be instrumental in the release from 
liquidation, and in the event of the acceptance of an offer the involvement of 
the company is beyond dispute (23). 
CLASS OF MEMBERS AND/OR CREDITORS 
The initiator, in consideration of the purpose of the arrangement or 
compromise, is to decide which class of members and /or creditors should be 
made parties to the scheme. The section is of no assistance in determining a 
class, but members and creditors can be separated into classes with reference 
to similarity of voting rights at meetings. However, it has been held that upon 
consideration of the sanctioning or otherwise of an arrangement or 
compromise the court may have regard to the dissimilarity of the interests of 
members or creditors of a particular class(24). The approach of the court in 
respect of a class, is that the meaning must be confined to persons whose 
rights are similar to such an extent, that it would be possible for them to 
"consult together with a view to their common interest" (25). The true 
distinguishing factor however, is that of the similarity of rights; and the 
reference to a common interest is therefore merely ancillary. Interests may be 
divergent among members with similar rights. Such divergent interests cannot 
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be considered as a basis of classification for meetings to consider a 
compromise or arrangement. However, the interests of an idividual member or 
creditor may be considered by the court when it considers whether such 
creditor or member has acted in good faith towards the interests of his class. 
Too much emphasis on the interests of a member or creditor may unduly 
protract the process of decision (26). 
The rights and obligations inherent in a class of shares issued to a member will 
determine the class of a member; and the nature of the claim of a creditor, 
that is, whether preferent, secured or concurrent, will determine the class of 
the creditor. 
A matter which has often been in issue, is whether the term "creditor " also 
includes a "contingent creditor". In Australian Law (27) the view has been 
taken that the term also includes provisional creditors,as well as those with 
unliquidated claims. Section 311 (2) provides that an arrangement must be 
accepted by a majority in number representing three quarters in value of the 
creditors. There is no provision in our legislation as to how the claim of a 
contingent creditor is to be valued, nor is there an indication how such a claim 
is to be valued by a receiver or any other person after the approval of an 
arrangement. Flowing from this, there is a difficulty to calculate the dividends 
accruing to a concurrent contingent creditor. 
Accordingly, it was suggested in the Namex case (28) that a solution would be 
to treat each such creditor as a "class" of its own, unless the same condition 
relates to the claims of a number of creditors. In effect then, Section 311 (2) 
would be applicable to contingent creditors, but every such creditor would 
have to accept the arrangement 1n so far as it relates to 
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him at a separate meeting. However, the offer would then have to contain one 
to contingent creditors, if the intention is to bind them; and it is to stipulate the 
value to be placed on their claims for purposes of payment in terms of the 
scheme. 
It has now been held that the phrase "all the creditors or the class of 
creditors"should not be strictly literally interpreted (29). It has reference only 
to those creditors to whom the offer has been addressed; and the offer needs 
not involve all creditors of the company. There is no difficulty with it being 
only intended for certain stipulated concurrent creditors of the company. An 
approval is not binding on creditors who by law are not empowered to accept 
an offer. Thus an unknown claim for future income tax cannot be waived by 
the Treasury (30). The underlying intention behind Section 311 (2), is that 
creditors who are entitled to, should accept. 
In respect of an unknown tax claim (31) it is to be stressed that creditors are 
bound to an arrangement not by virtue of the approval, but by agreement 
and/or by statute. If upon interpretation of "creditors" certain creditors are not 
included, they are not bound and they need not oppose the approval. Such 
creditors are not affected by the order, even though the order stands. 
ANCILLARY PROVISIONS 
Section 311 (3) 
In terms of this subsection, the liability of a surety for a company shall not be 
affected by an arrangement or compromise, and accordingly there needs be no 
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reference to the rights of creditors against sureties in the agreement (32). 
However, it has been held (33) that the subsection did not prevent parties from 
"contracting out of" the position brought about thereby, and therefore the 
court could consent to an arrangement containing a cancellation of a guarantee 
in favour of debenture holders of which a majority had voted in favour of the 
acceptance of the arrangement. The result was that the minority, having 
voted against the acceptance of the arrangement, was still bound by the 
cancellation of the guarantee. 
In the IGI case (34) the Appellate Division expressed doubt that the court could 
consent to a creditor who has voted against the acceptance of a scheme of 
arrangement, being held bound to a term providing for the termination of his 
right to proceed against a surety, as he has not, contracted out of the 
protection contained in Section 311 (3). The court considered a deemed 
cession by creditors· to the initiator of a scheme, of claims against the 
company, together with their right, title and interest in and to security for such 
claims (35). The respondent had been successful in the court a quo in a claim 
against the appellant on the grounds of a suretyship by the appellant in favour 
of the respondent for payment of the debts of the company which were the 
subject matter of the scheme. The Appellate Division upheld the decision of 
the court on the basis that by virtue of Section 311 (3), the deed of suretyship 
could not be seen to have been included in "security" as referred to in he 
scheme. It was held that the legislator could not have intended that it was 
possible for creditors to give up their protection under Section 311 (3) 
gratuitously, that is without receiving any compensation or advantage, by 
including a suretyship in this manner. 
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INCOME TAX AND OTHER PUBLIC MONIES 
For some time schemes of arrangement were sanctioned in terms of which the 
claims of public bodies were diminished or compromised, and such bodies 
considered such schemes to be binding upon them. This position was however 
temporarily changed by the judgement of Schabert, J in the Mercian case (36), 
who held that the sanctioning of a scheme by court was not intended by the 
legislature to serve as a statutory mechanism to grant a municipality the 
capacity to "contract in defiance of its relevant right and violation of its 
relevant duty" (37). This case dealt with the refusal by the municipality to 
issue a rates clearance certificate persuant to a sale of immovable property by 
the company, on the basis of an outstanding balance in local levies payable 
from the pre-liquidation period, in terms of Section 48 of the Local Government 
Ordinance of 1 939. The company sought a declaratory order that these claims 
had been compromised by an offer of compromise duly sanctioned by court. In r 
effect the court held that it had been ultra vires the municipality to have 
submitted to the scheme as established (38), and accepted the view of 
· Pennington (39) that a court could only sanction a scheme which would be 
valid without the court's sanction if every creditor or member agreed to it. It 
could not sanction what the parties could not do by agreement, and all it could 
do was to make it binding on dissenting creditors or members. 
This view was accepted a quo in the Namex case, and it was stressed that the 
court would not sanction a scheme which is contrary to the general law or in 
fraudem legis; nor did Section 311 empower the court to sanction a 
transaction which the parties cannot themselves undertake. Section 311 
could not be used to enable a company to do anything ultra vires. 
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Van Heerden JA in the Namex case (40) had no difficulty with the principle 
that in general, a tax collector is not competent to remit tax, to diminish it 
through compromise, or to cede the right of recovery thereof. Any departure 
should be authorised by the common aw or legislation. 
He cited the Union College case (41) in which Voet (42) was relied on as a 
basis in common law for a tax collector to enter into a binding compromise for 
an amount less than that of his claim. De Villiers JA in the Union College case 
could see no reason why a legal persona in the position of a municipality 
should not have the power, for the purpose of carrying out its statutory 
functions, . of settling disputes and questions of liability without being 
compelled to have recourse to a court of law (43). Such compromise must be 
entered into in the case of a problematical dispute, and the rule is that the 
state, in particular the tax collector, must not be prejudiced by a waiver. 
There can be no prejudice to the fiscus, if the tax collector waives part of his 
tax claim, upon certainty that he would not otherwise be able to collect more 
than the remaining portion. Indeed, a compromise in respect of a 
problematical question may also contain benefits for the fiscus, in that it does 
not run the risk of discovering after a lenghty and costly recovery process that 
the putative amount was never due. The tax collector may, after the noting of 
an appeal upon the rejection of an objection, come to a compromise in respect 
of a problematical dispute. 
He therefore came to the conclusion that a government body can indeed under 
common law validly consent to an arrangement in terms of Section 311, if it is 
to receive no less than what it would have received in the event of a final 
liquidation. Furthermore, even in the event of the absence of a consent, it will 
be bound by an approved arrangement, as it will not be held bound to 
something it could not contractually do. 
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The decision in the Mercian case (44) did not change the above common law 
exception, as Schabert J (45) stressed that there was no suggestion that the 
municipality was saddled with a void or slender prospect of recovering the 
taxes due to it. The company had ample assets with which to settle the 
claims of the municipality. Van Heerden JA indeed pointed out that there had 
not been any argument in the Mercian case (46) that the municipality received 
by concurrent dividends as much as or more than it would have received in the 
event of final liquidation. 
This common law position is indeed furthermore confirmed by Section 31 (1 )(i) 
of the Treasury Act, in that it empowers the Treasury to approve a 
compromise or abandonment of a state claim. Section 31 (2) qualifies this 
power, in that the Treasury may in its discretion approve the full or partial 
writing off, of an amount owing to the state if it is convinced that the amount 
is not recoverable, or that it would be to the benefit of the state to enter into 
the waiver or compromise. Therefore Sections 31 and 32 provide a 
mechanism therefore for a government body to wholly or partially waive a 
claim for tax. Subject to the requirements thereof, an arrangement in terms of 
Section 311 ( 1) of the Companies Act including an offer in respect of such a 
claim, may be accepted by the government body. Also, should it not accept 
the arrangement, and the Court approve it, the government body would be 
bound to something it could have achieved contractually. 
Normally an arrangement will make provision for the full payment of a known 
tax claim, as same is preferent in terms of Section 342 of the Companies Act, 
read with Section 101 (a) of the Insolvency Act. In instances however where 
the free residue may not be sufficient to settle the claim in full, an amount 
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more than, or equal to what the state would have received through liquidation 
procedures may be included in the scheme. Approval of the scheme will bind 
the state, and the balance of the tax claim cannot be later claimed from the 
company (4 7). 
There is a general rule that carelessness cannot prejudice the fiscus, and on 
this basis it was contended in the Namex case (48) that should the tax 
collector not have proved his claim as a result of carelessness or otherwise, 
the full amount of the tax claim could still be recovered from the company, 
notwithstanding the fact that the scheme had stripped him of his claim. The 
court held that there was no reason why the state could not agree to the 
scheme simply because failure to comply with a procedural requirement could 
lead to the loss of a determined state claim. 
A further general rule is that a state official cannot cede a claim such as one 
for tax (49). In this respect Van Heerden JA held in the Namex case (50) that 
it can make no difference to the company whether the relevant amount is 
owing to the tax collector or the initiator. Such an agreement is one between 
the company and its creditors including the tax collector (51 ), and the 
company through the liquidator agrees to the cession or supposed cession. 
The initiator receives cession of the right to recover the (possibly reduced) 
amount from the company, and cannot assume the special powers which by 
statute vest in the tax collector, and which powers cannot be transferred with 
the right of recovery. In practice there will be problems inherent in the proof 
and recovery of a claim, but the efffectiveness and validity of the cession is 
not affected by these. Even if a tax claim could under no circumstances be 
ceded, a tax collector would be bound by all the other provisions of a standard 
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scheme, one of which is that that after approval a creditor may only enforce 
his former claim against the receiver. A transfer of the claim to someone else 
is of no importance to a creditor, and if it cannot be ceded it falls away (52). 
THE CODE AND RULES 
The Securities Regulation Code on Takeovers and Mergers aknowledges that 
takeovers and mergers may be effected by schemes of arrangement. A 
scheme of arrangement is defined as a compromise or arrangement between a 
company and its members or any class of them in terms of Section 311 to 
Section 31 3 of the Companies Act. 
In terms of Section 4408 the Securities Regulation Panel was established, and 
this Panel brought the Code into being. Section 440C empowers and requires 
the Panel to make rules on and regulate all transactions and schemes which 
may be defined as affected transactions (53). The Code is an attempt to 
ensure fair and equal treatment for all holders of shares in takeovers and 
mergers, and to act as a framework for the conduct of such transactions. The 
Code has the force of law, and affected transactions must comply with it (48). 
The fields of application of the Code are where the company is a public one, 
whether listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange or not; and where the 
company is a private one, where the shareholders' interest valued at the offer 
price, and the shereholders' capital, exceed R5 million and there are more than 
ten beneficial shareholders. The proviso is that the executive director of the 
Panel may exempt any transaction affecting a private company, if he is 
satisfied that there is no possibility of prejudice to minority shareholders. 
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The Code provides that all holders of shares in the same class should be 
treated similarly by an offeror. Should an offer be made to more than one 
class of shares, a separate offef should be made to each class. The Code 
defines an offer as including one in respect of an affected transaction, 
howsoever effected. 
Rule 29 provides that upon the implementation of an offer by a scheme of 
arrangement, the company in respect of which the scheme is proposed shall be 
deemed to be the offeree company for the purposes of the Rules, and the 
holders of the relevant shares of the company after the sanctioning of the the_ 
scheme, shall be deemed to be the offeror. Furthermore the Rules pertaining 
to disclosure and notice shall apply to offers implemented by scheme of 
arrangement,unless an order to the contrary has been made by the Supreme 
Court,or unless the Panel has permitted otherwise. 
SECTION 424( 1 l 
A matter deserving some consideration is whether a person who ceases to be 
a creditor of the company by virtue of a sanctioned compromise or 
arrangement, can institute an action in terms of Section 424( 1) to render 
persons who had knowingly participated in any fraudulent or reckless conduct 
of business of the company, personally liable. In general, creditors will never 
receive payment of their entire claim persuant to a compromise or 
arrangement. If such creditors could proceed in terms of Section 424( 1 ), they 
could possibly recover full payment, as opposed to a dividend in a sanctioned 
~cheme. If such creditors should however lose their locus standi to proceed in 
terms of Section 424( 1 ), such loss of locus standi deserves consideration by 
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the court when deciding upon the sanctioning or otherwise of an arrangem_ent 
or compromise. The question which therefore arises is whether the rights of 
creditors in terms of Section 424( 1) are ipso iure extinguished when an 
arrangement or compromise is sanctioned; and if not, whether the person 
acting after the sanctioning and implementation of an arrangement or 
compromise is a creditor within the meaning of "creditors of the company" 
contained in Section 424(1 ). 
In the MSL case (55) a creditor would in terms of an arrangement receive a 
nominal dividend in respect of his claims, and the unpaid balance would be 
ceded to the initiator; and upon the payment and cession the creditor would 
have no further claims against the company. It was held by Stegmann J in 
this case and subsequent ones (56) that in such an instance such a creditor 
would not be entitled to proceed in terms of Section 424( 1). Upon the 
sanctioning of an arrangement containing a cession of a creditor's claims to 
the proposer, a right to proceed in terms of Section 424 passes from the 
cedent (creditor) to the cessionary (proposer). On the one hand, the creditor 
would have no locus standi to proceed against the company in terms of 
Section 424 and on the other, should the debts and liabilities of the company 
be extinguished upon the sanctioning of an arrangement, Section 424( 1) 
cannot operate as in order for this to happen, the company must have debts or 
other liabilities (57). 
The Cape Provincial Division expressed a different view in the Pressma case 
(58). The court could not accept the loss of the remedy of Section 424(1 l by 
the sanctioning and implementation of a compromise in terms of Section 311. 
To give effect to one of the objectives of Section 424, that is, a remedy 
against abuse, the court was of the opinlon that "creditors of the company" 
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had to include a person in respect of whom there had been an existing 
indebtedness upon the sanctioning of the compromise. 
Stegmann J again rejected this view in the Carbon Developments case (59). 
He again held that Section 424 could not operate if the company had no debts 
or other liabilities, which would be the position if creditors were to extinguish 
or novate their claims against the company. In the event of the cession of a 
claim and not the extinction or novation thereof, the right to proceed in terms 
of Section 424( 1) will pass to the cessionary as an ancillary right to the ceded 
claim. 
The Appellate Division (60) unfortunately did not express itself on the question 
whether a sanctioned compromise or arrangement with the effect of the 
extinction of the debts of a company would preclude a declaration in terms of 
Section 424( 1). Arguments were however raised that a reference to debts in 
Section 424( 1) is to debts incurred by the company at the time of the alleged 
wrongful conduct and not necessarily to ones still owing by the company at 
the time of the application under Section 424(1 ). 
In the light of the aforegoing, creditors should weigh up the certainty of a 
dividend, against the effect of the line of decisions in the courts, as well as the 
costs of court procedure. Furthermore the deductibility of the unpaid amounts 
of the claims for tax purposes could also be a positive consideration. Finally, 
an arrangement under Section 311 would not preclude criminal proceedings at 
a later stage (61 ). 
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SECTION 312 
This section provides that when any meeting is summoned under Section 311, 
every notice shall be accompanied by a statement explaining the effect of the 
compromise or arrangement. In the statement, all relevant information 
regarding the value of the shares or debentures involved in the arrangement 
should be contained, as well as the material interest of directors of the 
company, that is, whether as directors, members, creditors or otherwise, and 
the manner in which it may have a different effect from the like interests of 
other persons, on the compromise or arrangement. 
The statement should as far as possible give all information reasonably 
necessary to enable the recipients to decide on their votes. The court .should 
be provided with a copy of the statement when a sanction is sought, to 
determine whether adequate information has been given to the creditors or 
members pertaining to the effect and implications of the compromise or 
arrangement. 
Material non-compliance with Section 31 2 will usually deter the court from 
sanctioning a scheme (62). 
SECTION 313 
The underlying reason for this Section, is to facilitate a compromise or 
arrangement in terms of Section 311. If it is shown to the court that a 
compromise or arrangement is proposed for the purpose of the reconstruction 
of a company, or the amalgamation of two or more companies, and under the 
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scheme the whole or part of the undertaking or property of a company is to be 
transferred to another company, the court may make the issues referred to in 
Section 31 3( 1 )(a)-(f) applicable in order to give effect to the compromise or 
arrangement (63). In terms of Section 313(2), should an order under Section 
31 3( 1) provide for the transfer of property or liabilities, such property or 
liabilities shall vest in the transferee company. Transfer of property must 
however be effected in due form. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
SECTION 311: APPLICATIONS AND PROCEDURE 
APPLICATIONS OF SECTION 311 
The only arrangements to which the section expressly refers, is to ones 
concerning companies in liquidation ( 1 ). Practically speaking it is then mostly 
applications of this nature which are most commonly brought, namely by 
liquidators of companies in liquidation, persuant to shemes of arrangement 
proposed by the liquidators. It has in fact been suggested by the Appellate 
Division that possibly only the liquidator of a company would have locus standi 
to bring the application (2). It may be stated that provisional liquidation 
affords the company in financial difficulty some respite from claimants, and 
then "an honest broker" enters the scene to revive the company (3). The 
procedure has indeed become a standard one, although its use has until 
recently been filled with uncertainty. It must however be remembered that the 
proceedings under the section in fact cover arrangements of the widest 
possible character(4), and that it would be impossible to determine an 
exhaustive list of instances of application. 
The underlying reasons for the section are that the impossibility or 
impracticality of obtaining the individual consent of every member or creditor 
of the class intended to be bound by a scheme, is being overcome, and the 
frustration of a beneficial scheme by a minority of members or creditors of a 
class is being avoided (5). Furthermore, the initiator of a scheme will not have 
to face numerous claims by unknown creditors in future. The procedure 
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in terms of the section enables a potential investor to invest in a company in 
difficulty, without having to negotiate a compromise with each creditor 
individually. 
· Assessed Loss 
Apart from the disharge from provisional liquidation, enabling the company to 
recover and continue business as before, a well-known instance is the 
availability of an accumulated assessed loss to . potential investors in a 
company in financial difficulty. Often the acquisition of the assessed loss and 
its preservation is a chief object of the initiator of a scheme of arrangement or 
compromise in terms of Section 311 . 
An assessed loss and its utilisation is covered by Section 20 of the Income Tax 
Act; and briefly it may be defined as the amount by which the admissible 
deductions exceeded the income in respect of which they are so admissible, or 
should the context so require, an assessed loss as determined under Section 
36. Section 20(1) provides that in order to determine the taxable income of a 
person carrying on trade in the Republic, any balance of assessed loss incurred 
during any previous year which has been carried forward from the preceding 
year of assessment, shall be set off against the income derived by the 
taxpayer from such trade. However, the balance of the assessed loss is to be 
reduced by the amount or value of any benefit received by or accruing to a 
person as a result of a concession granted by or a compromise made with his 
creditors whereby his liabilities to them have been reduced or extinguished, if 
such liabilities arose in the ordinary course of trade. Should the value of the 
benefit received which reduces the assessed loss exceed the assessed 
loss,such excess is not added to the income in the current or future years. 
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In the Zinn case (6) it has been held that a benefit of compromise accruing to a 
company reduces the balance of the assessed loss, but this should not be 
added to the gross income of the company. Furthermore, it was held in the 
case that such compromise benefit reduces the balance of the assessed loss to 
be carried forward at the end of the year of assessment, and that it does not 
reduce the assessed loss carried forward from the previous year. The 
provisions of Section 20(1 )(a)(ii) should therefore be kept in mind, and the 
operation thereof may be avoided by minimizing compromises with creditors. 
Cession of Rights of Recovery by Creditors 
Usually in the event of a company in provisional liquidation, a determined or 
determinable amount is made available by the initiator, which is mainly 
intended for distribution amongst the creditors of the company. Secured and 
preferent creditors are normally to be paid in full, or to the extent of their 
security or preference, and concurrent creditors are to receive a dividend. 
Once the scheme is approved by court, the company is released from 
provisional liquidation. It must be kept in mind that as soon as a company is 
placed under provisional liquidation, all creditors of the company have an 
interest in the fate of the liquidation process, and any one of them may oppose 
confirmation of the provisional order or in circumstances join the application as 
joint applicant. The issue of the cession of creditors'rights of recovery to the 
initiator of a scheme is therefore also an important characteristic of a scheme 
under the Section. • 
Recovery from Liquidation 
Upon the approval of a scheme by court, and the simultaneous release from 
provisional liquidation the company can once again act freely through its 
directors. Futhermore the company has only one known creditor,and the old 
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creditors cannot again apply for liquidation on the basis of their previously 
existing claims (7). This situation reflects an arrangement between a company 
and its creditors, but in view of the insolvency of a company it is seldom that 
in such an event the arrangement will only be made between the company and 
its creditors (8). The standard offer is also made to the liquidator; and 
particularly where a company has obtained a provisional order of its own 
accord, the offer is also aimed at getting the consent of the liquidator to a 
release form liquidation. In practice therefore, the liquidator is the suitable 
(and possibly the only) person to launch an application in terms of Section 
311 ( 1) (9). The company must be passive in these proceedings, simply 
because after the provisional liquidation the control over the company vests in 
the provisional liquidator. In a secondary sense however,the arrangement, as 
seen, contains one between the company and its creditors. 
Variety of Uses 
A company in financial difficulty, or on the verge of, but in an attempt to avoid 
liquidation,can utilise the procedure in order to seek concessions from creditors 
to avoid liquidation, to raise additional funds from existing shareholders or from 
an outside party, to modify the rights of creditors and shareholders inter se, 
and to determine a dispute over rights and their enforcement. 
Furthermore other advantageous uses, would be to effect amalgamations or 
reconstructions (10), or mergers and takeovers (11 ). A general underlying 
policy issue, is that of the retention of the benefit of assets, goodwill, 
trademarks, permits etcetera, as a reason for applying for he approval of a 
scheme. 
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All the above reasons for the proposal of an arrangement or compromise, 
require and result in the alteration of established rights. Such alteration of 
rights may be contractually created, and Section 311 offers a procedure by 
which the fairly common impossibility or difficulty to negotiate with each 
creditor or member may be overcome. Apart from that,it assists in the 
prevention of the frustration of a beneficial scheme by a minority of class 
members. 
PROCEDURE 
The procedure followed in respect of Section 311, corresponds largely with 
those followed in terms of similar legislation in England and Australia (11 ). 
There are four identifiable phases to the procedure to be followed. In the first 
place an application is made to court to summon the requisite meetings. Once 
the court has granted an order for the meetings to be held, the meetings are 
convened and held where the proposed scheme is discussed and voted upon. 
Thereafter a further application is to be made to court in order to obtain 
sanction for the proposed compromise or arrangement. If the court sanctions 
the scheme, the compromise or arrangement will have no effect until the 
sanction order has been registered with the Registrar of Companies in terms of 
Section 311 (6)(a). 
Consent to Convene 
In the papers for the application for consent to convene meetings, sufficient 
information must be set out in order to convince the court that there is a 
reasonable probability that the requisite statutory majority of creditors or 
members of the company may accept the scheme. Furthermore, the bona tides 
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of the initiator of the scheme should be fully dealt with in order to convince the 
court that on the face of it, the scheme appears to have been made made 
honestly and in good faith. The terms of the proposed scheme should be set 
out in unambiguous and understandable terms. Sufficient background 
information as well as information concerning the scheme itself should have 
been gathered and set out in full. This information should be set out in such a 
manner that when it is furnished to the creditors or members it may be 
reasonably expected that on the basis thereof they will be able to assess the 
relative merit to the scheme and any alternatives thereto ( 1 3). 
When the court consents to the meetings being held, it will also set out in its 
order certain directions according to which the meetings are to be held. 
Section 311 (2) refers to the requisite statutory majorities being attained by 
members or creditors present and voting either in person or by proxy at the 
meetings. Often the voting is a mere formality by reason of this provision, 
brought about by the non-attendance of creditors or members to protect their 
interests. 
Sanctioning of Scheme 
When the requisite majority approval has been obtained, the court has to be 
approached yet again by means of an application to exercise its discretion in 
favour of the sanctioning of a compromise or arrangement. The applicant 
bears the onus of proof that on the basis of his averments, the court ought to 
grant the sanction. The applicant should inter alia state in his affidavit that the 
statutory provisions (including the matter contained in Section 31 2) have been 
complied with, and that there has been a fair representation by those present 
of the classes of creditors or members. The court will investigate the motives 
of those voting in favour of the compromise or arrangement; and accordingly it 
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must be clearly established in the papers that such persons have been acting 
bona fide in the interests of a particular class. At the same time, the rights 
and to an extent the interests of all the different classes of creditors and/or 
members will be weighed up in order to ascertain as to whether they all 
receive reasonably fair treatment within the scheme. 
Furthermore the scheme will be evaluated objectively in order to to determine 
whether it may be reasonably expected to be approved by an average 
businessman. An important underlying issue in all instances, is one of public 
interest and commercial morality. In this respect the provisions of Section 424 
( 14) will be brought into consideration, in particular whether the submission of 
the scheme itself, or any action relating to it may give rise to proceedings in 
terms thereof, to obtain an order rendering personally liable all persons who 
had knowingly participated in any fraudulent or reckless conduct of the 
business of the company. 
Company discharged from Winding Up 
In the event of an offer of arrangement or compromise pertaining to a company 
being woundup, there is a term providing for the discharge of the winding up 
order, or the dissolution of the company without winding up, the liquidator 
must submit a report to the Master in terms Section 400(2), as well as a 
report as to whether or not any director or officer or past director or officer of 
the company is or appears to be personally liable for damages or compensation 
to the company or for any debts or liabilities of the company under any 
provision of the Companies Act. The Master shall then apply his mind to these 
reports, and render a report thereon to the court (15). The report of the 
liquidator is to be requested well in advance and the report of the Master 
obtained in good time for filing with the papers at court. 
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The sanctioning or otherwise of the scheme is entirely in the discretion of the 
court, and for the exercise of this discretion there have been certain guidelines 
set out in the case law, and these guidelines should not be seen as limitations 
on the discretion of the court. In spite of an approval by the requisite majority, 
the court still exercises its discretion and does not act as a mere rubberstamp 
(16). 
The Appellate Division ( 17) has given consideration to these issues, and stated 
the position as follows: 
"' At the stage of an application for leave to convene meetings the 
court is primarily concerned with the probable response to the 
offer of the creditors: 
'If the Court, on a consideration of all the information at its 
disposal, comes to the conclusion that there is a reasonable 
probability that the requisite majority of the creditors of the 
company may accept the offer, it will, generally speaking, order a 
meeting of creditors to be convened; on the other hand, if it is 
not so satisfied, it will refuse to make such an order.' 
Per Trengrove J in Ex parte Bruyns NO: In re Mammoth Construction & 
Drilling Co (Pty) Ltd (under Provisional Liquidation) 1973 (3) SA 721 (T) 
at 722B-C. 
While that is the primary question, the Court is also concerned that the 
offer, on the face of it, appears to be made in good faith and honestly, 
and that its terms are unambiguous and understandable. 
Over a century ago, Fry LJ posed the question as to the circumstances in 
which a Court should sanction a resolution approving a compromise or 
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arrangement under the relevant provisions of the 1870 Joint Stock 
Companies Arrangement Act. He said the following in In re Alabama 
New Orleans, Texas and Pacific Junction Railway Company· [ 1 891] 1 Ch 
213at247: 
'I shall not attempt to define what elements may enter into the 
consideration of the Court beyond this, that I do not doubt for a 
moment that the Court is bound to ascertain that all the 
conditions required by the statute have been complied with; it is 
bound to be satisfied that the proposition was made in good faith; 
and, further, it must be satisfied that the proposal was at least fair 
and reasonable, as that an intelligent and honest man, who is a 
member of the class, and acting alone in respect of his interest as 
such a member, might approve of it. What other circumstances 
the Court may take into consideration I will not attempt to 
forecast.' 
would respectfully adopt that formulation. It is clearly the proper 
approach at the sanction stage. Although compliance with the statutory 
conditions will not be relevant at the stage of convening meetings, the 
other considerations referred to by Fry LJ are no less appropriate. They 
strike a balance between the duty of the Court to be satisfied that the 
offer appears to be fair and honest, and the recognition that it should not 
dictate to men of business what is in their own interests. 
It would be inappropriate to attempt to formulate a more precise rt.ne in a 
matter of discretion and in a context where the variety of facts and 
circumstances is endless." 
The Court considering such an application should also be satisfied that 
sufficient information has been gathered and can be furnished to the creditors 
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to enable them to assess the relative merits of the proposal and of the 
alternatives thereto. Indeed Section 312( 1) of the Act requires that, where 
meetings are summoned under Section 311, every creditor or member must be 
sent a statement containing the information set out in subparagraph (a) 
thereof. A draft of that statement need not be placed before the Court at the 
stage of an application for leave to convene meetings. At the sanction stage it 
must clearly be before the Court in order that it may satisfy itself that the 
provisions of Section 312(1) have been observed. 
When a compromise or arrangement has been sanctioned by' the court,a 
contract, although not yet effective, comes into being between the company, 
and the creditors or members of the company. 
In the case of Ex Pa rte Ensor ( 1 8) it was stated by Didcott J that even though 
the compromise comes into being through the order of the court, it is still 
intrinsically a contract. In spite of the contract being brought into operation by 
the court, it has the same level of control over it as with any other sort of 
contract. Also in the Robin case ( 19) an arrangement was characterised as 
"plainly contractual, albeit compulsory in respect of the minority". This 
contractual nature remains just that, even though third persons like the 
proposer or a receiver must make finance available or execute certain 
administrative or other acts. 
In terms of Section 311 (6)(a) an order of the court sanctioning a compromise 
or arrangement shall have no effect until the lodgement in the prescribed form 
of a certified copy thereof with the Registrar of Companies, and the 
registration thereof by him. Section 311 (6)(b) provides that every copy of the 
memorandum of the company issued after the date of the order shall be 
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accompanied by a copy of the court order as annexure; and a failure to do so 
shall be a criminal offence, in terms of section 311 (7). 
- 33 -
CHAPTER FOUR 
ARRANGEMENT AND COMPROMISE BETWEEN A COMPANY AND ITS 
CREDITORS, AND ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN A COMPANY AND ITS 
MEMBERS 
THE COMPANY AND ITS CREDITORS: 
For some years, firstly under Section 103 of the Companies Act of 1 926, and 
thereafter under the present Section 311 a standard procedure was developed 
and in common use, consisting of certain uniform elements. In the case of a 
company under provisional liquidation, an outsider would offer to make a 
certain amount available for distribution amongst creditors of the company. 
Secured creditors would be paid in full or to the extent of their security or 
preference, and a concurrent creditor would receive a dividend. Such payment 
would only be received by creditors who submitted proof of their claims in a 
prescribed manner. Usually upon approval of the scheme, the creditors would 
be deemed to have ceded their rights of recovery against the company to the 
offeror. The fictitious cession would not be the full claim, but one diminished 
by a certain portion thereof. Once the scheme was approved the company 
would be released from provisional liquidation ( 1 ). 
Earlier (2) the "uniform elements" appear to have been an offer by an outsider 
to acquire by cession the claims of creditors against payment; and secured 
and preferent creditors would not receive less thereof than they would have 
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received upon winding up of the company. Concurrent creditors would receive 
a greater dividend than what they would receive upon winding up of the 
company. The issue was then cast into disarray on the basis that a scheme 
such as this could not be termed a compromise between the company and its 
creditors, as there was no element of an adjustment of rights present between 
the parties as debtor and creditor. Accordingly the matter was thought to 
have been cleared up by the insertion of a term containing a reduction of the 
claim of each creditor by a nominal amount, thus inserting an element of 
compromise (3). This nominal reduction became a common feature in every 
compromise, and schemes of this nature became known as the standard 
scheme (4). These schemes were expressed to be commercially beneficial, as 
the initiator gained control over the company, often with an assessed loss 
usable for income tax purposes whilst the company could continue trading as 
before, not in insolvent circumstances (5). 
The standard scheme was however temporarily brought to a halt in the 
Transvaal and the Cape, where a fatal defect was identified therein (6), whilst 
in Natal the validity thereof was upheld (7). The basis for the rejection of the 
scheme was that a scheme of this nature was in reality an arrangement 
between the initiator and the creditors of the company, and not one between 
the company and its creditors. The Appellate Division albeit with a minority 
decision, has now by its rejection of the view that the company is not involved 
in a scheme of this nature, opened the door for the return of the standard 
scheme (8). The result is that the door has now apparently once again been 
opened for the use of the standard scheme in its later form, without the 
permutations used in order to overcome the problems arising from the rejection 
thereof. 
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The later form consisted of an agreed nominal reduction of claims by the 
creditors, and thereafter a deemed cession of these reduced claims to the 
initiator against payment of the amount payable in terms of the arrangement or 
compromise. The reason for the nominal reduction, was that it was believed 
that the jurisdictional requirements concerning an arrangement or compromise 
between the company and its creditors as contained in section 311 were being 
satisfied by such reduction. 
Robin 
Coetzee DJP, in the Robin case (9) rejected the standard scheme on the basis 
that the court could only order a meeting to consider an arrangement between 
a company and its creditors or members. A third party could be involved, but 
if he is a party to the exclusion of one of the others the prerequisites of 
Section 311 are not being complied with. Accordingly in this case it was held 
that in the event of the cession of the reduced claim, there was merely a 
compromise between the offeror and the creditors of the company. The view 
that the nominal reduction of the claim validated the arrangement between the 
company and its creditors was rejected by the court. 
It identified two parts to any ordinary compromise or arrangement, namely the 
substance which can be the subject of an order under Section 311, and the 
conditions for the implementation of the scheme, which conditions could not 
stand alone. The substance of the particular scheme was a nominal reduction 
of creditors' claims, and the proposed cession thereof was not related to the 
I 
implementation thereof. The court held that the ancillary conditions were 
included for the implementation of the cession and not the reduction part of 
the contract. The cession part of the contract, as an arrangement between 
the creditors and the offeror, was disregarded leaving the reduction aspect 
only which was not relevant to anyone. 
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Multi-Bou 
The Cape Provincial Division in the Multi-Bou case ( 1 0) held as in the Robin 
case , that the substance of a standard scheme is the cession of the reduced 
claims of the creditors of the company. As the cessions did not involve the 
consent or participation of the company, it could not be described as an 
arrangement between the company and its creditors. Berman J held that the 
scope and purpose of the section is limited to the consideration of an 
arrangement between the company and its creditors, and not one between its 
creditors, or its creditors and a third party. Unless there is an arrangement 
with or without the inclusion and participation of a third party, between the 
company and its creditors, an application to have the scheme referred to 
meetings of creditors cannot succeed. Furthermore, if there is no reduction of 
creditors' claims, the cession against payment between the creditors and the 
offeror, is an arrangement which does not involve the company. An 
agreement to reduce, likewise does not involve the company, being merely an 
instruction to the company to reflect reductions in its books of account. The 
reduction is also not a compromise as this presupposes a dispute. The court 
further rejected counsel for the applicant's argument that the company's 
agreement would be necessary for the partial cession to be effective and 
enforceable. 
Strydom 
The position in Natal was however different, in that Friedman J ( 11) held that 
the standard scheme fell within the ambit of Section 311, as the deemed 
cession was indeed an arrangement between the company and its creditors. 
In view of the fact that the cession was "deemed", the participation of the 
company was necessary, as it has to acknowledge a fictitious situation; and 
the deemed cession was an arrangement between the company and its 
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creditors for the purposes of Section 311. The court could differ with the 
judgement in the Multi-Bou case, in view of the fact that in it there was no 
deemed cession present. It rejected the judgement in the Robin case in view 
of the fact that it stressed the acquisition of the claims of the creditor, without 
keeping in mind its means of achievement, namely a deemed cession. 
Important issues referred to by the court as reasons for the standard scheme 
to be viewed as an arrangement between the company and its creditors, are 
that it is a device to obtain cession of all the creditors' claims, even those who 
are unknown or unwilling; and it is a device by which a company may arrange 
with its creditors for the equal treatment of all of them ( 12). 
Namex 
It is submitted that the Appellate Division by its minority decision in Namex 
( 1 3) has now brought some clarity in respect of the use of the standard 
scheme. It held that if a scheme does in fact involve the company, it would 
fall within the ambit of Section 311 (1 ). The terms "arrangement " and 
"compromise" are not synonymous; and a compromise presupposes a dispute, 
which an arrangement does not. Reference was made to Berman J using the 
word "compromise" figuratively in the Multi-Bou case(14) in classing an 
adjustment of rights between the company and its creditors as "the distinctive 
feature of compromise". A scheme in which creditors of a company would 
receive less than their full unopposed claim, would be an adjustment of rights . 
The contention concerning the creditors' claims against the the company being 
reduced without its co-operation ( 15) was rejected, as a partial settlement of a 
debt requires the co-operation of the debtor ( 16). Van Heerden JA agreed 
with Coetzee AJP in the Robin case, that the mere existence of a deminution 
provision does not mean that a standard scheme has an arrangement between 
the company and its creditors as its object. The company is however involved 
by such a provision. 
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In respect of the issue of deemed (supposed) cession, it was held not to be a 
consensual cession, but merely deemed to be such. Such a term involving a 
deemed cession then implies that the company is bound to the cession by the 
creditor without the necessity of a consensual cession. 
The aims of the initiator and the statutory mechanisms to bring them about 
should not be confused. In the event of all creditors accepting the offer a 
contract comes into being, whether Section 311 is used or not. The very 
purpose of the existence of the section in the statute books however is that it 
is a mechanism by which to hold all creditors bound to an accepted scheme, 
especially in the event of impossibility to obtain acceptance by all creditors. 
On approval, those who have not accepted become statutory parties. The 
reason why a cession comes into being is the binding provision of section 
311 (2) alone, and no consent or co-operation of the company is required . 
This therefore makes the debate around the deemed cession of recovery rights 
in schemes of arrangement irrelevant. 
The point is also that a deeming provision Is not aimed at an arrangement 
between a company and its creditors. However the scheme may still be 
brought into the field of Section 311 ( 1). In this respect Van Heerden JA 
approved of the statement in the Multi-Bou case ( 17) that the section does not 
require that a scheme should only involve an arrangement between a company 
and its creditors. As a result of the insolvency it will hardly happen that an 
arrangement will only be between the company and its creditors. With a 
company in liquidation it appears to play a passive role; and the offer is also 
directed at the liquidator in order to release the company from liquidation. The 
fact that the control of the company in liquidation vests in the liquidator, 
indeed explains the apparent passivity of the company in such an instance. 
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However, even though on the face of it the company does not appear to be an 
active party to an arrangement, it still contains an arrangement between the 
company and its creditors. Without considering the issue pertaining to 
reduction of claims, a standard scheme may be brought under Section 311 (1 ). 
Assessed Losses 
A point which the courts do not often appear to consider and pronounce on, is 
the important underlying purpose of a compromise or arrangement, namely, to 
retain the benefit of an assessed loss of a company in financial difficulty or in 
the process of_ winding up, should the company be placed on a profitable 
footing again. In drafting a scheme the requirements both of Section 311 
and Section 20( 1 )(a)(i) are therefore important in respect of an arrangement 
or compromise between a company and its creditors. When considering the 
retention of an assessed loss the provisions of Section 103(2) of the Income 
Tax Act must however be kept in mind by the draftsman of the scheme. The 
section deals with the disallowance of the setting off of an assessed loss 
against income received, if the sole or main purpose of an agreement is the 
avoidance of tax. The sole or main reason for an agreement affecting the 
company should therefore be a commercially sound one, like obtaining the 
benefit of the company's assets, goodwill, trademarks, tradenames, permits 
etcetera, in.order to avoid the operation of the section. 
In order to retain the benefits of the assessed loss in respect of a particular 
year of assessment, the company must have carried on trade during the 
following year, even if it was only for a part of the particular year. The reason 
is that Section 20(1 )(a) of the Income Tax Act requires that there should be a 
continuity in setting off of an assessed loss in every succeeding year after it 
was originally incurred, as long as the company has continued trading. A 
continuity in trading with the intention of earning an income therefrom is the 
important issue, even though no income at all is derived therefrom. 
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Another important provision to be kept in mind, is that contained in Section 
20(1 )(a)(ii), in that it provides that the balance of an assessed loss is to be 
reduced by the value of any benefit received or accrued as a result of a 
compromise with creditors as a result of which liabilities to them are reduced 
or extinguished. The implication of this is therefore that any concession by or 
compromise with the company's creditors must be limited as far as possible in 
the scheme. This was successfully attained in the later standard scheme by 
means of the minimal reduction of creditor's claims, until at least in Transvaal 
and the Cape the decisions in Robin and Multi-Bou temporarily demanded 
some rethought. The rethought involved a continued effort to retain the 
advantages of Section 311, and to design schemes preventing a reduction of 
assessed loss to the company in terms of Section 20(1 )(a)(ii). It appears that 
now after the minority decision of the Appellate Division in the Namex case 
the way has been opened for a return to the use of the standard scheme. 
Preference Share Schemes 
During the preceding period and as a result of the Robin and Multi-Bou cases, 
certain attempts have been made to preserve the assessed loss of the 
company by amending the nature of the scheme proposed. One such scheme, 
known as the "preference share scheme", was approved in the Sackstein 
case( 1 8) as being an arrangement between the company and its creditors. In 
terms of the scheme the reduced claims of the creditors are converted into 
preference share capital, and the creditors renounce their rights to the 
allotment of such shares in favour of a person nominated by the company, 
such person usually being the proposer of the scheme. Payment to creditors 
is then limited to the dividends payable in terms of the scheme. Such 
dividends are derived from loans to the company, usually by the proposer, or 
the issue and allotment of shares in the company, usually to the proposer. In 
the Sackstein case the preference shares were redeemable in nature, although 
the court makes no express reference to this. A scheme of this nature falls 
- 41 -
within the requirements of Section 311, but relating to Section 20( 1 )(a)(ii) the 
courts have made no clear pronouncement on whether it would be able to 
preserve the assessed loss of the company. 
Serious doubt was expressed about the scheme by Urquhart (19), inter alia 
because there is an extinction or reduction of liabilities to the company, which 
could result either from a concession by, or compromise with the creditors, 
and the receipt of dividends by ,creditors results from their renunciation of 
rights to the preference shares. Section 20(1 )(a)(ii) applies to concessions as 
well as to compromises, and according to Urquhart the creditors may well be 
making a • concession to the company as contemplated by the section. 
Reasons advanced for this view, are that the acceptance of preference shares 
instead of liabilities is a concession as liabilities rank prior to the shares on 
liquidation and the shares are issued at par value, but their actual value will be 
less. 
Hope was expressed by Jooste (20) that Section 20( 1 )(a)(ii) could be 
overcome by the preference share scheme. Subsequent to the Sackstein case, 
on the assumption that it dealt with preference, and not redeemable 
preference shares, the same author was not as positive(21 ). In respect of 
preference shares the view was that the company would receive a clearly 
defined benefit. It has subsequently been submitted that by the adoption of a 
preference share scheme the company may well lose a substantial portion of 
its assessed loss, as a result of which the scheme would not be effective from 
a tax point of view (22). 
On the assumption that the first article by Jooste, and the Sackstein case may 
be seen as dealing with the issue of redeemable preference shares, it appears 
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that with the issue of such shares the form of the liability of the company 
simply changes, with the amount thereof remaining the same. The liability to 
repay the debt is substituted with an obligation to redeem the shares at a par 
value equal to the amount of the debt. 
Subordination and Capitalisation 
In the standard scheme the liabilities of a company remained the same, and 
one creditor was merely substituted for another by means of the cession of 
claims of creditors. By virtue of the fact that the inherent financial position of 
the company did not change by such an arrangement, the court in the Robin 
case (23) felt that in view of possible harm by disreputable persons, public 
interest demanded that a scheme of this nature should not be perpetuated. As 
a result of an argument by counsel it was tendered that the ceded claims be 
subjected to subordination or be converted to new capital to render the 
company solvent, and the last suggestion was found to be preferable by the 
court. 
In the Strydom case (24) the court disagreed both in respect of the stated 
problem in Robin, namely the insolvent company being free to continue trading 
in an insolvent state, as well as the proposed solution, namely, the conversion 
to new capital. It was in agreement that the company was insolvent in the 
sense that its liabilities exceeded its assets, but stated that the true test for 
the solvency of a company was its ability to pay its debts. There was nothing 
commercially and legally unsound to allow a company to continue trading in 
such circumstances, and there was no reason why later creditors should 
receive greater protection in the event of release from liquidation in terms of a 
sanctioned scheme of arrangement in terms of Section 311. Furthermore, in 
terms of Section 20(5) of the Public Accountants and Auditors Act No 80 of 
1 991, upon failure of a shareholder /creditor of a company trading in insolvent 
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circumstances to subordinate his claims against the company to those of other 
creditors the continued trading of the company must in any event be reported 
as a material irregularity. Furthermore, the capitalisation requirement was 
stated to be of little practical effect, in view of the fact that immediately after 
the sanctioning of the agreement the company was free to reduce its capital 
back to the situation as before. Although this issue was not canvassed by the 
Appellate Division in the Namex case, there was acceptance of the recovery of 
the company from insolvency. 
Stegmann J rejected the idea of the restoration of a company to solvency by 
means of a subordination agreement in several judgements. He likewise 
rejected the view that it would provide a material safeguard for future creditors 
(25). 
The Cape Provincial Division (26) however held that it was possible to restore 
a company to solvency, provided that where the liabilities in terms of the 
balance sheet exceed the assets, the subordinated debt remains a contingent 
liability. Further factors the court will take into consideration,, will be if the 
company appears to be solvent immediately after the sanction, and the 
improbability of being made insolvent again by pre-sanction liabilities, as well 
as the availability of sufficient working capital to conduct the business of the 
company. It was furthermore held that subordination as opposed to 
capitalisation would preserve the assessed loss of the company. 
The judgements by Stegmann had a wide-ranging influence on the issues 
surrounding subordination, until the Appellate Division brought some clarity. In 
effect the court held that by agreement the enforceability of a debt is made 
dependent upon the solvency of the debtor, and prior payment to other 
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debtors. Furthermore, the fact that the liabilities of the company exceed its 
assets, will not necessarily entail fraudulent or reckless conduct if further 
debts are incurred. In the event of insolvency the subordination of a claim 
would not interfere with statutory ranking on insolvency. There is no claim 
unless the other creditors are paid in full. The court pointed out that there were 
numerous companies trading with practically no share capital conducting 
business by means of loans by shareholders, and these loans will often be 
subordinated to ensure that it does not exceed the assets of the company. 
Should the views of Stegmann be accepted, the effect would be that 
numerous officers of private companies would have been acting unlawfully or 
dishonestly for decades (27). 
Section 20(1 )(a)(ii) applies only if all the requirements thereof are satisfied, 
including a reduction or removal of liabilities arising out of the compromise 
between the company and its creditors (28). A concession made by the 
company does not necessarily involve the reduction or extinction of a liability. 
Excluded Creditor Scheme 
The Cape Provincial Division was in support of the view that the solvency of a 
company could be obtained by subordination and not capitalisation (29) and on 
the basis of this and subsequent to the Robin and Multi-Bou cases the 
"excluded creditor scheme" was developed. In this sort of scheme the 
proposer lends money to the company, but certain creditors are excluded from 
the operation of the scheme. A compromise of the claims of scheme creditors 
takes place and are discharged fully, against payment of a monetary dividend, 
and often from the proceeds of the sale of company assets. The claims of the 
excluded creditors are dealt with outside the scheme, by means of cession 
between the creditor and the proposer without involving the company. Usually 
the proposer pays the creditor the same dividend for such cession, as the 
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scheme creditors receive. As the claims of the excluded creditors usually form 
a large portion of the total of the claims against the company, the total value 
of the scheme creditors is relatively small. The assessed loss is then reduced 
in terms of Section 20(1 )(a)(ii) by this relatively small amount. The cession of 
the excluded creditors is no cause for setoff against the assessed loss, as it is 
not part of the scheme. The result of the scheme is the complete discharge of, 
the claims of the scheme creditors, and the vesting of the excluded claims, 
subject to the subordination. 
New Cape Scheme 
Inter alia due to difficulties in agreeing with all creditors, as well as the dangers 
of the proposers being held at ransom by creditors outside the scheme, further 
attempts were made to devise alternatives in terms of Section 311 whilst 
retaining most or all of the assessed loss. The result was a judgement by the 
Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division concerning a scheme of arrangement in 
terms of which the proposer would lend the company a capital sum for the 
payment of dividends to its creditors subject to certain conditions (30). The 
conditions are that should the scheme be sanctioned, the creditors would only 
be entitled to receive their dividend in terms of the scheme, and no creditor 
shall have further claims against the company thereafter apart from this. Any 
outstanding claims of the creditors shall furthermore be deemed to have been 
ceded to the proposer who shall be deemed to have purchased and acquired 
them, and the capital sum and the ceded claims shall be subject to 
subordination. 
In practice the effect of this new scheme, is that the company will be solvent 
and in a position to continue trading. It furthermore differs materially from the 
standard scheme, and no reliance is placed upon the varied standard scheme 
as encountered in the Multi-Bou case. The absence of the claims of scheme 
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creditors, embodies a compromise between the company and the scheme 
creditors. The company itself acquires funds for the compromise, and this 
constitutes an arrangement between the company and its creditors in 
accordance with Section 311 . This sort of scheme is not subject to the 
objections raised in the Robin and Multi-Bou cases primarily because of the 
clear involvement of the company itself in the operation of the scheme. 
Debenture Scheme 
A further sort of scheme to which brief reference may be made, and which 
was developed subsequent to the Robin case, is the so-called "debenture 
scheme". · The principles therein contained are the same as those in the 
preference share scheme, except that instead of the issue of redeemable 
preference shares, debentures are created and issued. Advantages of this sort 
of scheme are again that the company is directly involved, in that it issues the 
debentures, and accordingly it may be termed a scheme which encompasses 
an arrangement between the company and its creditors. Furthermore the 
assessed loss of the company is preserved, and the debentures are 
subordinated. 
In spite of the "new Cape scheme" and other forms serving an important 
purpose in commerce, the submission is that there is now no necessity to 
endeavour to bypass the implications of the Robin and Multi-Bou decisions by 
putting together complicated schemes of arrangement or compromise, in order 
to come within the ambit of Section 311, and to preserve the assessed loss of 
a company. The way is now clear for a return to the standard scheme as 
discussed above. 
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THE COMPANY AND ITS MEMBERS 
The procedure under Section 311, as opposed to other procedures under the 
Companies Act is often used in order to bring about takeovers and mergers 
(31), mostly by reason of the voting procedures for the approval of a scheme 
in Section 311 (2). What usually happens in the event of the acquisition of all . 
the shares, or the shares of a particular class, the reorganisation of the 
authorised and issued share capital of the offeree company takes place, 
whereby the offeror becomes the holder of such shares. The courts have 
rather inconsistently approached the question whether such takeover may be 
effected by means of Section 311, especially where there are other 
procedures in the Act to effect the same result (32). 
Federale 
In the Federale case (33) the company holding the majority of the ordinary 
shares in another, would become the only ordinary shareholder of such 
company by way of the cancellation of the ordinary shares of the minority 
sharehoders therein. In accordance with this, the company would effect a 
reduction of capital. The minorities on the other hand would receive shares in 
the takeover company. It was held by the court that one could view the 
events in the company being taken over as an arrangement between it and its 
minority shareholders in terms of section 311. The shares in the takeover 
company, represented the compensating advantage to the minority 
shareholders of the other company. At the same time it was held not to be a 
takeover as defined in Section 314(1) as there was no offer for the acquisition 
of shares. The court also implied that provided there was indeed an 
arrangement between a company and its members, the existence of the 
provisions for a takeover in _Sections 314-321 did not militate against the use 
of the arrangement procedure in section 311 in order to effect a takeover (34). 
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Satbel 
After the Satbel case (35) the use of Section 311 to effect takeovers was 
severely limited. In this case the shares of existing shareholders would be 
taken over by means of a payment in cash. According to the court, in order to 
comply with section 311 ( 1), there must at least be a re-arrangement of 
shareholders' rights; and where the rights of shareholders disappear completely 
against payment, there is no re-arrangement, but an expropriation. An 
arrangement meant not a disappearance, but the survival of rights in a 
different form·. 
Natal Coal 
In the Natal Coal case (36) the minority shareholders were to receive money in 
return for the compulsory acquisition of their shares. Here the court was of 
the same view as in the Satbel case. 
Suiderland 
The Suiderland case (37) dealt with two schemes of arrangement in respect of 
two associate companies. Here the Cape Provincial Division differed from the 
decisions in the Natal Coal and Satbel cases. There was to be a reduction of 
capital, and the majority shareholders were to take over the shares of the 
minority shareholders. Shares o/ the minority were to be cancelled against 
payment of cash. It was held that the scheme was an arrangement within the 
meaning of Section 311, and the cash payment was the compensating 
advantage. Only in the event of a confiscation, namely the loss of rights 
without receiving anything in return, would there not be the requisite element 
of give and take. 
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NBSA 
The NBSA case (38) dealt with a proposed scheme in which the entire issued 
share capital in various property owning companies was to be acquired by a 
management company, during the formation of a property fund in terms of the 
Unit Trusts Act. An arrangement was proposed in terms of Section 311 
between the company and its members, which arrangement would involve the 
reorganisation of the capital structure of the company, and the transfer of the 
resulting shares to the property fund against payment of cash. It was held 
that the arrangement was one between the company and its members, and fell 
within the ambit of section 311. Coetzee DJP stated that it was incorrect to 
hold, as he did in the Satbel case, that a cancellation or an acquisition of 
shares against payment of money could not fall in with Section 311. 
Goldstone J stated that a cash payment for shares removed the matter from 
the operation of Section 311. 
In respect of the use of Section 311 in order to attain a reduction of capital, 
Coetzee DJP disagreed with the Suiderland case in that he felt that the Section 
311 procedure was not an alternative to other statutorily prescribed 
procedures. He was of the opinion that once a scheme involved a reduction of 
capital, it could not be attained by the procedure in Section 311. However he 
did not ,find anything wrong with a reduction of capital being done in 
\ 
conjunction with the Section 311 procedure. He concluded therefore that the 
decision in the Natal Coal was correct, although not for the same reasons. 
It may be noted that the view in the Suiderland case is supported by English 
and Australian authorities (39). Therefore, where the totality of the scheme is 
in the ambit of Section 311, then notwithstanding the fact that part of the 
scheme has a reduction of capital as a result, Section 311 may be followed, as 
the reduction of capital is but one step in a whole series. 
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Meyer 
In the Meyer case (40) the court heard an application in terms of section 311 
for the sanctioning of a scheme of arrangement, in terms of which the 
applicant company would become the wholly owned subsidiary of its majority 
shareholders. Certain minority shareholders opposed the sanction. The 
scheme was sanctioned by the court, and inter alia held that good and 
sufficient reasons for the proposed scheme had been advanced, adequately 
supported by the documentation filed. Furthermore Section 314 required an 
offer by the offeror company directly made to the shareholders, without 
consideration of the offeree company, and this was not being complied with. 
Even if the requirements of Section 314 had been met this was no bar to 
proceedings in terms of Section 311, if the requirements thereof could be met. 
The only limitations in respect of an arrangement in terms of Section 311, 
were that the court could not authorise something contrary to general law or 
wholly ultra vires the company, and upon the reduction of capital the 
formalities must also be complied with. 
Mielie-Kip 
In the Mielie-Kip case (41) an arrangement was proposed for the acquisition of 
all the shares of the minority shareholders in one company by another, in 
return for which the minority would receive a certain amount in cash. The 
essential element was a purchase and sale of shares, and therefore the court 
decided that the proposed scheme was not an arrangement as provided for in 
Section 311 . Flemming DJP held that Section 311 essentially required an 
absence of unanimous consent to a beneficial scheme when the scheme 
involved an adjustment of rights. What is required is a binding adjustment or 
altered basis with some bearing on what had previously been in existence, and 
this could relate only to a transaction directly affecting the proprietary rights 
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of shareholders in their shares. The relationship between the company and its 
members must be affected. The court held further that a purchase of shares is 
an arrangement between a purchaser and seller, and not between the 
company and its members. An important statement in this case, is that the 
court will look at the totality of the proposed arrangement to see if it creates a 
sufficient arrangement between the company and its members to fall within 
Section 311. A question raised obiter was why Section 311 should be 
~vailable to a party about to attempt a takeover, when section 314 can be 
utilised for that purpose. 
Garlick 
In the Garlick case (42) the applicant had leave to convene a meeting of 
shareholders to consider a scheme of arrangement proposed in terms of 
Section 311 . The proposal entailed the acquisition of all the issued ordinary 
shares of the company not owned · by it or its wholly owned subsidiaries and 
their nominees. Shareholders would receive cash for each existing share of 
the company. The scheme of arrangement was sanctioned by the court. As 
in the Mielie-Kip case the final effect of the scheme was the acquisition of 
shares of members against payment of cash, but the scheme differed 
materially from the Mielie-Kip case in the sense that the manner in which the 
scheme was structured and proposed reflected the company very much as an 
involved party to the scheme. 
' 
The object of the scheme, that is the acquisition of shares, according to the 
court, did not remove the scheme from the ambit of an arrangement as 
contemplated by Section 311. 
• 
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Therefore, Section 311 as opposed to the repealed Section 314 can be used to 
effect a takeover, provided the scheme of arrangement is between the 
company and its members. It may be remembered that the Code 
acknowledges takeovers can be effected by means of an arrangement in terms 







Central issues in the struggle around the application of section 311 and the 
ancillary legislation have been the involvement or not of the company, and the 
preservation of the assessed loss to the company. The Appellate Division has 
now especially in its acceptance of the fact that a standard scheme may be 
brought home under Section 311, ( 1) ensured that the standard scheme will be 
available for beneficial use, especially in the instance of companies in 
provisional liquidation. Admittedly the majority found it unnecessary to decide 
whether the standard scheme represented an arrangement or compromise 
between the company and its creditors. It was however held by the majority 
that in view of their usefulness and value to the business sector the provisions 
of the section should not be narrowly interpreted. Importantly the involvement 
of the company does not need to be significant. The submission is 
nonetheless that the judgment by Van Heerden JA will weigh heavily in favour 
of the sanctioning of a standard scheme by our courts in future. 
It would appear that from the point of view of the industry, and with the 
benefit of hindsight that the period of uncertainty before the Namex decision 
had some favourable effect. The Robin and Multi-Bou decisions namely had 
the effect that members of the industry were forced to devise a variety of 
alternate schemes, which will continue to be of application with suitably 




Clearly there is no certainty in respect of the matters in which the courts will 
exercise their discretion, and an attempt to formulate exact rules for the 
exercise of such discretion would be unwise. The term "arrangement" for 
instance is accepted to have a wide meaning, and in fact if an arrangement is 
not contrary to general law or wholly ultra vires the company, and it touches 
the rights and obligations of the company and its members and/or creditors, 
such arrangement may be brought under Section 311. The courts, without 
limiting their discretion, will constantly weigh up the jurisdictional requirements 
of section 311, and the interests of the majority and any dissenting minority, 
as well as public policy. They will attempt as far as possible not to interfere in 
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